UCT Debacle report in The Chief......In a scathing series of draft reports, the outside consultants hired by Mayor Bloomberg to review his 911 system overhaul found in 2011 that the system initiated two years earlier�which is still in use today�was �dangerous� to citizens and first-responders, and that it introduced �new, unacceptable risks� for them.
The report, produced by Winbourne & Costas, was especially harsh about the Unified Call Taking system, a portion of the overhaul that reassigned all calls�including fire emergencies�to NYPD dispatchers, who now forward information to the Fire Department electronically. The fire unions obtained the Winbourne drafts last week after suing for them as part of a public-safety challenge to UCT before the Board of Collective Bargaining.
A Mess From the Start
While the consultants maintain that a properly-implemented UCT program can significantly improve emergency response, they said the city�s version failed because it was poorly planned, inefficiently run, and lacked a clear command structure.
Major errors in the new system�s electronic mapping of city addresses posed a �significant risk to successful public-safety operations,� the consultants said. They confirmed the fire unions� repeated complaints that wrong addresses, unclear information, and miscoding of incidents have hampered the efforts of FDNY responders since the revamp.
The authors also echoed complaints by Fire Alarm Dispatchers Benevolent Association President Faye Smyth, who told THE CHIEF-LEADER last year that her members were inundated with extra computer screens� worth of information. Ms. Smyth said the extraneous notes, which are poorly organized, hampered response efforts during Hurricane Sandy.
The Winbourne report found that under UCT, Fire Dispatchers saw a 124-percent increase in informational screens, and that �the design and configuration of the UCT interface does not meet the requirements that allow for Fire Dispatch to operate in an efficient and accurate manner.�
Faults Police/Fire Schism
Earlier versions of the report, which was revised several times during the summer of 2011, were damningly worded, though later versions were also harsh. In notes prepared in April 2011 for Deputy Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, the authors called UCT �a complete failure,� and wrote, �The dysfunctional relationship between NYPD & FDNY concerning the 9-1-1 system is dangerous to everyone and requires immediate attention.�
�NYPD thinks they own the 9-1-1 system,� the authors added, calling for teamwork between the two agencies and proper governance between them.
The consultants also contended that dispatchers weren�t trained properly, writing that two years after the overhaul, �no person from either dispatch center understands how the UCT interface works.�
�In this case, a huge waste of tax revenue was expended on a failed project,� they concluded.
Later drafts were somewhat more diplomatically phrased, but by August 2011, the consultants still described the UCT system as creating �new unacceptable risks for both first responders and citizens that have yet to be resolved.�
Blue, Red and Redundant
Ten years after the Sept. 11 attacks prompted experts to recommend better collaboration between city first-responding agencies, the consultants wrote that there was �little to no collaboration and cooperation� between the NYPD and FDNY, either during normal daily 911 operations or during major crises. They said that response times were increased by a �disorganized� system that often left NYPD and FDNY operators performing redundant operations.
The authors also slammed the city for its financial management of the project. In a June draft, they said the UCT system �fail[ed]� in part because the administration didn�t properly plan for the change. The Mayor failed to do a cost-benefit analysis or return-on-investment research before the project was implemented, they said, and didn�t identify any baseline performance standards to measure the new system against.
They faulted the city for consulting expert contractors and then refusing to follow their recommendations, and accused the administration of providing statistical analysis to demonstrate the success of the project that were �erroneous and provide[d] no value regarding the effectiveness of UCT-related business processes.�
�No Meaningful Analysis�
�In essence, over $19 million was spent on the UCT project without exploring any of the available options in advance,� the consultants wrote in one of the last of many drafts, which totaled more than 5,000 pages altogether. They added that �had any meaningful operational analysis been completed,� the city could have avoided many of the pitfalls.
An FDNY spokesman declined comment on the report, but Uniformed Fire Officers Association President Alexander Hagan said that none of the report�s recommendations had yet been implemented.
�Our entire organization feels vindicated in our quest to expose the truth,� he said. �We knew [UCT] was dangerous for our members. I�m positive that it also jeopardizes the lives of our brave police officers and not least, it seriously jeopardizes the safety and lives of the citizens. And if for no other reason than our ability to finally expose that, we are we�re extremely gratified that we didn�t give up the pursuit.�
Uniformed Firefighters Association President Steve Cassidy, who led the fight to obtain the report, said, �Starting in 2011 the Bloomberg Administration denied this taxpayer-funded report existed. The UFA fought for two years to force the administration to produce the report because it highlights the numerous flaws in the 9-1-1 system. The report shows that the Fire Commissioner�s testimony to the City Council over the past four years, in relation to response times, has been rendered false.� * *
Mr. Bloomberg ordered the 911 system revamped after an August 2003 blackout, when a lack of backup power left the city�s four emergency call centers incapable of handling a flood of extra calls. Fire, Police, and EMS dispatchers are now all located in a single Brooklyn building, with a backup center still to be completed.
Exposed by Blizzard
During the Dec. 26, 2010 blizzard, however, the system failed to handle the high volume of emergency calls, prompting the Mayor to order the consultant�s report.
He released a final version to the public in May 2012, which was critical of the UCT system but was then widely rumored to be sanitized. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel in April ordered the earlier drafts released to the fire unions in their entirety.